

The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict



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By
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**THE GLOBAL POLICY HORIZONS
LAB**

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Note from the Lead Author, Josh Hayes

This International Security Report aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, as well as the impact of international stakeholders. Through rigorous research and analysis, we endeavor to shed light on key trends, challenges, and opportunities in the realm of conflict and security as well as broader policy implications.

We hope that this report will serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and all those interested in understanding and addressing the complexities of contemporary conflicts.

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About the Author

Josh Hayes is an undergraduate student studying Political Science at Webster University in St. Louis, USA. His research focus is on stability in the Middle East, specifically in Israel and Palestine. With his policy-oriented research, he hopes to provide an analysis of the underlying conflicts that have shaped the region for centuries as well as propose a framework for future pathways to peace and stability. He has also written corresponding reports on the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.



About the Global Policy Horizons Research Lab

Webster University's Global Policy Horizons Lab is a policy-focused research entity where students, Lab researchers, affiliated faculty, as well as members of the policy community from across disciplines, can explore national and global security issues, generate original research, as well as produce peer-reviewed policy papers and commentaries. The Lab pursues innovative research focusing on unconventional threats, identity, and security, the role of technology in security, economic security, as well as environmental and food security. The goal of the Lab is to become a knowledge hub that informs national governments and other members of the global policy community on contemporary and future security challenges.



The current Director of the Lab is Professor Dani Belo, PhD.



Executive Summary

Following months of sustained attacks between Israel and Hezbollah, a militant group and Shiite political party in Lebanon, Israel entered Lebanon in September 2024 for a limited incursion that would push Hezbollah away from the border region. Initially, the move was met with skepticism by Israel's international partners, including the United States, given the already complex war ongoing in Gaza. However, after a period of internal discussions, the US supported a targeted incursion. This has been largely targeted at Beirut and its surrounding suburbs to move Hezbollah away from the border, reducing their capability to launch attacks either with soldiers or drones, and eliminating them as an effective Iranian proxy. Efforts to implement a ceasefire have been complicated by the internal political dynamics in both Israel and Lebanon, Iran's desire for its proxy Hezbollah to continue provoking Israel, the ongoing war in Gaza, and international pressure to end the current iteration of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. As of late November, a ceasefire has been reached in the short term. While in the short term, a return to escalation, as well as a complete end to the conflict, are unlikely, an eventual end to direct fighting as well as damaging Hezbollah's capacity to attack Israel are both goals of the international community. Moving forward, mediators will hope that the ceasefire holds, stabilizes Lebanon along with the Lebanese government, and de-escalates tensions between Israel and Iran before the region lurches further toward irreversible destruction with two states with near-nuclear capabilities.

Background

The longstanding conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, a militant group and Lebanese Shiite political party, has erupted many times over recent decades but is once again in danger of doing so now. Under a 1943 agreement, political power in Lebanon was shared by different religious factions including Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites. Diverging views among these factions devolved into a Civil War in 1975, of which Hezbollah emerged out of the ashes¹. Seeing the chaos in Lebanon, Israel invaded to push guerilla PLO fighters out of the country and as far away from their border as possible. This angered the Shiites in the Arab world, most especially the new theocratic government in Iran following their revolution, who through its revolutionary guard trained a gave funds to the newly founded Hezbollah. It gained early notoriety for a series of terrorist attacks on foreign targets and in its first released manifesto called for the destruction of Israel and established itself as a close ally of Iran. It maintains a presence in Lebanese politics as it controls parliament seats, but what is most significant is its paramilitary forces which some estimate to be in the tens of thousands of troops². It has historically clashed directly with Israel on several occasions, most significantly in 2006 when a full-scale war broke out for a month. The UN was able to negotiate a ceasefire that ended the conflict, although tensions continued for years. Following the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, there was a significant uptick in violence with Hezbollah signaling its support for Hamas, also a recipient of Iranian funding. Returned and sustained rocket fire on Israel's northern border with Lebanon has caused over a



million people to be displaced on both sides of the border and has sparked fear of a renewed full-scale conflict, all the while Israel remains at war with Hamas³. This is a dangerous possibility for Israel, the Middle East, and the entire international community⁴. Hezbollah is a much more potent threat than Hamas to Israel with its military capabilities but is still outmatched. The dangers involve a multi-front war at both borders for Israel and the potential for Iranian intervention. In late September of 2024, the IDF embarked on a limited incursion into Lebanon to push Hezbollah away from the border region. This fighting successfully limited Hezbollah's capabilities in the immediate future. For that reason, Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to enter into a ceasefire as of late November. The terms call for an end to offensive actions by both sides, end the rocket attacks into Israel, and call for Hezbollah to retreat behind a certain demarcation line with the US as a key mediator for this effort and its implementation. It is unclear if this ceasefire will hold but it is a significant step in the short term.

Primary Stakeholders

Actor	Impact	Effect
Israel 	Mixed	(+) The Israeli political spectrum is united in their belief that Hezbollah cannot continue to launch attacks and must pay a price. (+) Israel has launched a series of attacks meant to both cripple the infrastructure of Hezbollah but also its leadership. First, an elaborate and sophisticated attack that saw thousands of pagers belonging to Hezbollah officials, causing injuries and death⁵. This sent a strong message that Israel can strike in unconventional ways. Next came, the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, and by all accounts, its entire leadership. Then, a limited and targeted incursion into Lebanon to dismantle some of Hezbollah but also take out key targets that posed a military risk. (-) The Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under pressure from right-wing members of his government to do something to Hezbollah but also take the fight to Iran.
Hezbollah 	Negative	(+) Severely weakened by Israeli pager attacks the elimination of its leadership and thus willing to agree to the terms of a ceasefire.



Actor	Impact	Effect
		(-) Stood with Hamas following October 7 and bombarded Israel with a barrage of offensive rocket attacks, over 10,000 rockets fired at Israeli infrastructure and homes in the last year, escalating the conflict with Israel. (-) Contributed to the instability and gridlock in Lebanon
Iran 	Negative	(+) Iran would much rather Israel be involved with its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas than Iran itself. Unfortunately, however, this means they are more than willing to fund groups like Hezbollah. (+) Does not want a direct war with Israel as it could lead to a more focused effort to eliminate its potential to acquire nuclear weapons and the end of its theocratic regime⁶. (-) Iran has fired a series of rockets directly at Israel both in April and October 2024, both thwarted by the Iron Dome⁷. (-) Iran heavily funds Hezbollah to the tune of \$700 million a year⁸.
Lebanon 	Mixed	(+) Have signaled to Iran that their intervention on behalf of Hezbollah is helping to further destabilize the country⁹. (+) More amenable to cooperation with Israel than Hezbollah is. (-) Possesses a weak and unstable government that has proved ineffective at managing the country and keeping Hezbollah from controlling the south. They will now be tasked with significant responsibilities to make the ceasefire hold, something they may not be equipped for.



Secondary Stakeholders

Actor	Impact	Effect
United States 	Positive	(+) Wants no part of a broader Middle East war which is why they first want to reduce tensions with Israel and Iran to ensure the trend of escalation does not continue. (+) President-elect Trump's return to power in D.C. will likely benefit Israel from a negotiating perspective but may actually serve to be more capable of pressuring Netanyahu. (+) Successfully worked with France to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Arab States    	Mixed	(+) Arab states have unanimously supported efforts to reach a ceasefire (+) Arab leaders will attempt to push the incoming Trump administration towards a more neutral US policy in the region. (-) Arab leaders have been extremely critical of Israeli operations in Lebanon despite the offensive attacks being started by Hezbollah. (-) The Saudi Crown Prince blamed Israel for the escalation and called on them to stop its operations in Lebanon and stop provoking Iran¹⁰.
EU and France  	Mixed	(+) France has been outspoken from the beginning that a full-scale Israeli-Hezbollah war should be avoided. They have been very integral to reaching a ceasefire due to their relations with Lebanon. Netanyahu has lambasted French President Marcon for being outspoken against the escalation but has remained steadfast in his belief that Israel should abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1701¹¹. (-) The EU has been mostly nonexistent in the global conversations surrounding the conflict, as have most of the member states.



Actor	Impact	Effect
United Nations 	Mixed	(+) UN Security Council Resolution 1701, originally passed in 2006, has been the blueprint for the ceasefire agreement. UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, will also play a role¹². (-) The UN has done virtually nothing concrete to reach a ceasefire other than singularly criticizing Israeli actions. (-) UNIFIL was largely unsuccessful in 2006, so there is little confidence in its ability to enforce the ceasefire. For it to hold, there will need to be a will on both sides, as the UN will be incapable of keeping the peace¹³.

Risk Assessment Indicators

Extremely High Risk

High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

History of Armed Conflict

Level: High Risk

Trend: Declining

Stabilizing Factors

Lebanon-Hezbollah Schism: One factor that complicates an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah is that Hezbollah is essentially a state within a state. Israel and Lebanon do not want a war with each other as that would be disastrous for the Lebanese people and the country and Israel's fight is not with Lebanon. Additionally, because Hezbollah is a political party within Lebanon, it must consider how its actions will affect its outcomes within the Lebanese political system.

Iran's Reluctance to Engage Directly: Iran directly engaging in an Israeli-Hezbollah conflict is not in their best interest. Relations are already strained with the West due to its Russia connections and the new president, while limited in power, has struck a more moderate and cordial tone¹⁴. For this reason, Iran is unlikely to directly engage in the conflict, especially considering the Netanyahu government seemingly wants war with them.

Destabilizing Factors

Military Capabilities: The military capabilities of Hezbollah are recognized as being much more lethal and dangerous to Israel than Hamas. Whereas Hamas is less organized and not as well funded, Hezbollah is essentially a state within a state that acts with impunity in its interests and is



far more capable militarily. Not only does the group possess enough fighters, but they also have an estimated rocket and missile arsenal of over 100,000 including long-range ballistic missiles¹⁵. Israel is certainly more equipped than in its last war with Lebanon in 2006 but there are legitimate questions about whether it can manage a costly war in Lebanon now while simultaneously fighting Hamas in Gaza considering their history¹⁶.

Recent Pager Attack: Arguably one of the most innovative and successful examples of modern warfare, Israel's infiltration of the Hezbollah pager network followed by its remote detonation was a significant achievement. The operations were significant because they required a certain amount of human intelligence that signals that Mossad was able to infiltrate Hezbollah, potentially with their agents¹⁷. The explosion of these pagers and walkie-talkies meant injuries and deaths for many members of the Hezbollah network not to mention decreased confidence within the organization.

Assessment

A renewed war between Iranian proxy Hezbollah and Israel comes at a dangerous time for the region. Existing in the same environment as Israel's current war against Hamas in Gaza, Israel says it intends for their operations within Lebanon to be targeted and limited. The recent escalation still presents challenges and dangers for citizens both on the Israeli and Lebanese side of the border, who have now been displaced from their homes. Additionally, there is the danger of Iran becoming more heavily involved. Iran's attacks on Israel have thus far been telegraphed and limited in damage. But if both parties continue to climb the ladder of escalation, then a wider and more dangerous war could emerge.

Governance and Political Instability	Level: High Risk	Trend: Stable	
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Destabilizing Factors

Israel's Judicial Overhaul: A law passed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and some far-right members of his coalition in 2023 created much civil unrest before the October 7 attacks. The coalition wanted the law to restrict some of the power of its court system because it consistently ruled against some of its policies. The response to this was the largest protests in modern Israeli history against the government, threats by important businesses to leave, and military reservists suspending their voluntary duty¹⁸. The court struck down the law in early 2024 and the government has put its appeal on hold due to the war, but the clash is emblematic of the political and cultural divide within Israel today.

Electoral Gridlock: Israel has experienced much political gridlock over the last several years, including 5 parliamentary elections in less than 4 years. The primary cause was the corruption allegations against Netanyahu which later led to charges being filed. When he failed to resign, his coalition broke down. 3 consecutive elections failed to create a clear coalition. The fourth



election led to a very ideologically diverse coalition that temporarily ousted Netanyahu but failed around a year later. When Netanyahu returned to power, it was with a right-wing coalition that ran on unpopular reforms such as the judicial overhaul and provocative positions against Palestinians¹⁹.

Gridlock and Instability in Lebanon: The government in Lebanon has been paralyzed for several years. Hezbollah has legitimate political influence in the Lebanese parliament and the situation today is gridlock. Hezbollah has the means to block the proposals of the other coalitions legislatively and no other coalition has the power to put a check on their military operations proactively²⁰. This means Hezbollah essentially has free reign right now. A weak Lebanon is good for Hezbollah. It is still not in Hezbollah's interest to continue fighting a war it will almost assuredly lose. An all-out war could bring severe Israeli attacks on Lebanon and cause harm to non-combatant civilians. This could potentially backfire and cause disdain for Hezbollah as a political entity.

Assessment

Israel is a thriving democracy in a region, where hopes of democracy are few and far between. However, there are internal disagreements that pre-date the October 7 attacks and could continue to hamper Israel's foreign policy decisions and relationships around the world. Netanyahu is unpopular at home and abroad, but no other credible leader with broad support is currently positioned to take over. In Lebanon, the political situation is incredibly dire. Lebanon's parliament has been unable to name a president for years and its government remains in gridlock, emboldening Hezbollah to operate unchecked. The central question in this conflict is what Hezbollah looks like after the conflict and whether Lebanon can return to a functioning form of government, free from extremism.

Population Heterogeneity	Level: High Risk	Trend: Stable	
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Stabilizing Factors

Lack of Ethnic Diversity Within Each State: The population of Israel is approximately 9.05 million. The main ethnic groups the country comprises are the Jews 73.2%, the Arabs 21.1%, and others 5.7%²¹. The population of Lebanon is approximately 5.26 million. There is little ethnic diversity in Lebanon with the country being 95% Arab, 4% Armenian, and 1% other²².

Destabilizing Factors

Religious Diversity: Israel was founded on the idea of forming a haven for Jews both religious and ethnic alike. Overall, 75% of Israelis are Jewish, 17.5% are Muslim, with others making up the remaining groups²³. The Jewish population is relatively split between variations of secular and Orthodox. While not including the sizeable Syrian and Palestinian refugee populations in



Lebanon, Muslims make up approximately 68% of Lebanese (an equal mix of Sunni and Shia), and Christians at around 32%²⁴.

Assessment

Jews form a clear majority of Israelis, but a sizable Arab population is subject to much discrimination due to their support for Palestinian independence. In Lebanon, there are different factions of Muslims and Christians which creates no clear majority in the country. Ethnic and religious differences themselves are a central cause of the broader conflicts in the region. The centuries-long conflict between Jews and Palestinians and Jews and Muslims in this region are longstanding and not easily solvable. Peaceful cohabitation in the region between the two groups is the only long-term pathway to stability.

Demographic Stress	Level: Medium Risk	Trend: Stable	
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Population: Israel has a relatively small population of 9.05 million with a modest population growth rate of 1.56%²⁵. Lebanon has a population of 5.26 million with a low population growth rate of 0.68%²⁶.

Population Density: Israel has a high population density of approximately 415 people per square km as of 2023 with a once high but now slowly decreasing growth rate over the last 35 years²⁷. Lebanon has a high population density of 568 people per square km as of 2024, mostly concentrated around the capital city of Beirut and its suburbs²⁸.

Fertility Rate: Israel has a fertility rate of 2.94 children per woman²⁹ which is significantly higher than the OECD average range of 1.2 to 1.8 and makes it the highest rate in the group³⁰. Because of this, the current population aged 0-14 in Israel is 26%.50 Because of this, there are strong levels of health and education spending. Lebanon has a fertility rate of 2.23 children per woman which is also higher than the OECD average range. 20.75% of their population is ages 0-14³¹.

Assessment

While in some cases having a high population density and being a highly urbanized nation can sometimes be a negative thing, it is currently not a concern for Israel. The stable population and growth are signs of strength in both states. Despite the abnormally high fertility rate, it has not caused undue strain. Also, in some cases having a high population density and being a highly urbanized nation can sometimes be a negative thing, it is currently not a concern for Israel. In Lebanon, the biggest concern is the population density around Beirut and its suburbs. During any military campaign into Lebanon, which is currently underway, this could cause major damage to the civilians and local infrastructure as well as make it difficult for Israel to differentiate between Hezbollah and civilians in their attacks.



Economic Performance

Level: High Risk

Trend: Declining



Destabilizing Factors

Economic Instability: Israel's economy has long been stable and strong, especially in the tech sector. Before the recent wave of conflicts, there was already some economic concern due to the judicial overhaul as some companies decided to reincorporate in the United States. Since the attacks and the war in Gaza began, the economy has been strained severely, albeit somewhat resilient. Before the war, Israel's projected 2024 GDP growth was nearly 4% but it is now expected to be a paltry 1-1.9%. There are also further long-term concerns about the damage the conflict will do to the Israeli economy such as soaring budget costs, loss of high-earning taxpayers to other countries, and general uncertainty. In Lebanon, the war could have disastrous consequences on the already shaky state of things. The country has been in economic turmoil since 2019 with the central bank struggling to prop up the Lebanese pound and a large-scale banking collapse due to poor government policy and corruption³². According to Fitch's BMI, the Lebanese economy might contract by around 5% which is deeply dangerous territory³³.

Assessment

Israel's economy is strong and resilient, but the war is having serious impacts on tourism, employment, and the general business environment. The longer it goes on the worse the long-term consequences could be. Still, there is a consensus that Israel's economy will recover when the conflicts in Gaza and along the Lebanese border are resolved. In Lebanon, the war has worsened an already severe economic disaster as it struggles to get out of a multi-year crisis.

Human Development

Level: High Risk

Trend: Declining



Stabilizing Factors

Life Expectancy at Birth: As of 2022, life expectancy in Israel is high at 82.2 years³⁴. Additionally, Israel has a maternal mortality rate of 3 deaths per 100,000 live births, one of the lowest in the world. Life expectancy in Lebanon is relatively high at 79.2 years³⁵. Additionally, Lebanon has a maternal mortality rate of 21 deaths per 100,000 live births, lower than average.

Health Expenditures: Israel spent 8.3% of its GDP on health care expenditures which is continuing to increase, although it remains lower than the OECD average of 9.3%³⁶. Lebanon spends about 8.0% of its GDP on health expenditures³⁷.

Education: Israel ranks 19th in education expenditures at 7.1% of GDP. The total literacy rate is 97.8% and is similar for both males and females. The average years of schooling is 15 years for men and 17 years for women³⁸. Lebanon has one of the lowest education expenditures in the world at 1.7% of GDP as of 2020³⁹. The total literacy rate is at 95% with no meaningful difference between men and women. Additionally, the average years of schooling is 11 years.



Destabilizing Factors

Displaced Persons Along Israeli-Lebanese Border: Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the situation along the Israeli-Lebanese border has continued to escalate. Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel began in solidarity with Hamas and the people in Gaza, and Israel of course responded. In Lebanon, over a million people have been internally displaced, most fleeing north to avoid the attacks in the South⁴⁰. This has affected Lebanese citizens but also Syrian and Palestinian refugees who were already in the country. Meanwhile, in northern Israel, the Hezbollah rocket attacks have forced over 60,000 people to flee from their homes⁴¹. This is one of the biggest reasons that some of the more right-wing members of Netanyahu's government pushed for a full-on offensive into Lebanon.

Assessment

Human development is high in Israel and is not as bad in Lebanon compared to other neighboring countries. These conditions themselves are not a cause of the conflict. However, there is a real risk that continued fighting will strain the resources available in Lebanon, as well as Israel as they are also fighting in Gaza.

International Linkages	Level: Medium Risk	Trend: Declining
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Stabilizing Factors

Efforts to Reach a Ceasefire: The United States and France were key negotiators in the process of reaching a ceasefire. A key component of this ceasefire agreement will be the efforts to strengthen the Lebanese government, which France has some sway over. Support for international partners that help to stabilize Lebanon, their government, and their economy will help to make the ceasefire hold.

Recent Normalization Processes: One of the most recent and significant diplomatic breakthroughs in the Middle East was the Abraham Accords, which normalized diplomatic ties between Israel, the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain⁴². This has caused greater economic and security cooperation between the countries, but the process was always designed with an ultimate grand bargain involving Saudi Arabia and potentially the Palestinian Authority⁴³. Ensuring diplomatic efforts do not go cold in this process post-October 7 will be key to strengthening Israeli security.

Destabilizing Factors

War in Gaza: The conflict in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah is connected to Israel's war in Gaza against Hamas. The Hezbollah rockets began coming immediately toward Israel after the October 7 attacks showing Hezbollah's desire to take the fight to Israel in solidarity with Hamas.



Efforts to end both conflicts are necessary to secure peace in the short term, but they go in tandem with each other.

Iranian Funding of Hezbollah: Iran is one of the biggest players in the region and their funding of organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas make them an important factor in Hezbollah's viability⁴⁴. The intent is to allow Hezbollah to act as Iran's proxy in Lebanon. This is done through various mechanisms but a key part of this is also Iran's influence in Syria, another state recently thrown into chaos. These seemingly distinct disputes are all interconnected and help to destabilize the region. Further destabilization of the Assad regime in Syria would further weaken Iran and Hezbollah.

Assessment

The international community has played a significant role in efforts to reach a ceasefire and both Israel and Lebanon have relied on their international ties to stabilize the region. Not every international actor is beneficial for peace in the region however as Iran's meddling is making both Israel and Lebanon less safe. Further attempts to stabilize Lebanon will likely require pressure on Iran to stop funding Hezbollah to the degree it is now because Hezbollah will assuredly regroup after the recent losses.

Possible Scenarios for the Next Year

Best Case Scenario

The best-case scenario is that the current conflict fizzles out and de-escalates and the first necessary step of this is for the ceasefire to hold. This would allow Israel to focus entirely on Gaza and the plan for the war there. Additionally, signals would also be sent to Iran in public and via back channels that Israel, as well as the US, oppose escalation with Iran. Under this scenario, Israel would likely seek guarantees that Hezbollah either does not pose an immediate threat to them or that the Lebanese government will summon the strength to ensure that Hezbollah does not operate as close to the Israeli border as they have in recent years. While this best-case scenario would likely not be a significant change to conditions in the region, it would be in the best interest of all parties as displaced Lebanese civilians could return to their homes in Beirut and Israeli civilians could return to their homes along their northern border. Lebanon could focus on solving its internal gridlock, try to stabilize its economy and prevent further costly Israeli strikes on its infrastructure. Israel could stop the immediate kinetic fighting and focus on the next steps of the war in Gaza, which would hopefully coincide with a potential political solution as well.

Worst Case Scenario



The worst-case scenario is a return to escalation and a protracted conflict that sees Israel continue deeper into Lebanon for an indefinite period and sees Iran decide to forcefully enter the conflict rather than the continued escalation of telegraphed attacks between the two sides. Some would argue that PM Netanyahu's government wants a war with Iran, a war they are confident they would win, but this is a bad outcome. Additionally, the incoming US administration will likely be much more likely to escalate with Iran which makes this scenario more plausible than with the current Biden administration. The incoming Trump administration will likely not be opposed to Israel getting the war with Iran it potentially seeks. The good news is that a weakened Hezbollah is now unable to serve as an effective proxy for Iran in Lebanon makes this much more unlikely. An escalated war with Hezbollah and more importantly Iran would have long-term consequences for the region and would leave both the Israeli, Lebanese, and Iranian people worse off.

Most Likely Scenario

The most likely scenario is the successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement which would signal that the current round of this conflict is over. By successfully crippling the leadership of Hezbollah by killing Hassan Nasrallah and destroying much of its networks, Israel can claim a win in the short term. Still, Hezbollah nor its ideology will go away quietly. Israel will seek to cut off Hezbollah from Iran with the help of the United States. It is unclear what kind of sustainability Hezbollah can have in Lebanon without the significant Iranian support it currently depends on, but it is unlikely that its ideology specifically towards Israel will soon evaporate from the reality in Lebanese society. The group will seek to rebuild, which may take time, but it ultimately will. Instability in Lebanon will likely continue, but for the agreement to have any chance of holding, the Lebanese government must regain control of the south and regain control of its government.

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⁴ Boxerman, Aaron, and Hwaida Saad. "Dread Lingers in Mideast after Israel-Hezbollah Clashes." The New York Times, August 27, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/27/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-gaza-conflict.html>.

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¹⁰ "Saudi-Hosted Summit Says Middle East Peace Requires End to Israeli Occupation." The Straits Times, November 12, 2024. <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-hosted-summit-says-middle-east-peace-requires-end-to-israeli-occupation>.

¹¹ "In Clash with Netanyahu, Macron Says Israel PM 'Mustn't Forget His Country Created by UN Decision.'" France 24, October 15, 2024. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241015-in-clash-with-netanyahu-macron-says-israel-pm-mustn-t-forget-his-country-created-by-un-decision>.

¹² Chehayeb, Kareem. "What Is the 2006 UN Resolution That Some Hope Could Help to End the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict?" AP News, September 26, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/unsc-resolution-1701-lebanon-israel-hezbollah-addf018ce9da719329e1726f7156d456>.

¹³ "UN Resolution 1701 Is the Linchpin of the Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire. Will It Hold?" France 24, November 27, 2024. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241127-un-resolution-1701-is-the-linchpin-of-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-will-it-hold-in-2024>.

¹⁴ Erlanger, Steven. "Iran's Dilemma: How to Preserve Its Proxies and Avoid Full-Scale War." The New York Times, September 25, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/25/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hezbollah.html>.

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